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rancher wishing to lease a piece of equip-
ment has an item to trade in.  This can cre-
ate significant income tax problems if han-
dled as a single transaction – a trade in of
the used item and a leasing of the replace-
ment.
The problem is that a trade is a tax-free
exchange only if it is "held for productive
use in a trade or business or for invest-
ment" and is exchanged "solely for property
of like kind."20   An exchange of a tractor
for the lease of a replacement tractor, for
example, does not appear to be a like kind
exchange.21  Therefore, a trade of a used
tractor for a lease of a replacement tractor is
likely to be treated as a sale of the used
tractor and a lease of the replacement.  Such
a characterization would require recognition
of gain or loss, recapture of depreciation
and recapture of investment tax credit on
the trade in and a recalculation of the lease
payments for income tax purposes.  Quite
clearly, the better approach, at least from
the standpoint of simplicity, is to handle
such trades as two separate transactions –
(1) a sale of the used equipment to the
dealer and (2) a lease of the replacement
item.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE
PREEMPTION OF STATE
EXEMPTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT
PLANS BY ERISA
A number of cases have been published recently involving
the issue as to whether the  Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), preeempts state exemp-
tions for employment plans and prevents such exemptions from
being used at the state and federal levels.
The source of the issue is the U.S. Supreme Court case,
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d
836 (1988), which held that a Georgia anti-garnishment statute
was unconstitutional because the subject of the statute was pre-
empted by ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) .  The
Georgia statute expressly prohibited garnishments of ERISA
plans, except in the cases of alimony or child support.  Mackey,
however, did not involve a bankruptcy exemption.
Although one Texas Bankruptcy Court judge has ruled that
ERISA did not preempt the Texas exemption of ERISA plans, In
re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840 (W.D. Texas 1989) (Kel ly ,
B.J.) ,  other Texas Bankruptcy Court judges and  Arizona and
Mississippi Bankruptcy Courts have held state ERISA plan ex-
emptions preempted by ERISA based upon the ruling in Mackey.
In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex .
1989), aff'g point on rehear'g 93 B.R. 498 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1988) (Clark, B.J.); In re Flindall, 1 0 5
B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re Larson, 1 0 2
B.R. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re McLeod, 1 0 2
B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989); In re Dyke, 9 9
B.R. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).
The issue of whether ERISA preempts employment plan
exemptions of other states has yet to be tried.  The U.S. Supreme
Court in Mackey stated:
"ERISA § 514(A) preempts 'any and all State laws inso-
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan' covered by the statute."
ERISA governs:
"Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is
hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by
an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
by its express terms or as a result of surrounding cir-
cumstances such plan, fund or program–
"(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
"(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for
periods extending to the termination of covered em-
ployment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions
made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits
under the plan or the method of distributing benefits
from the plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
Under this broad definition and Mackey, most state employment
plan exemptions would be preempted by ERISA.
Note: Two courts have held that ERISA does not preempt
state IRA exemptions.  In re Laxson, 102 B.R. 8 5
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989)  (Texas IRA exemption not pre-
empted by ERISA); In re Martin, 102 B.R. 639 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1989)  (Tennessee IRA exemption not preempted
by ERISA).
Debtors have argued, without much success, that although
ERISA preempts state exemptions for employment pension
plans, ERISA itself is a federal exemption allowed under 11
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                                                          11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) by virtue of its prohibition of provisions
in the plan agreement for alienation or assignment of plan bene-
fits.  Most courts, however, have rejected this argument and de-
nied the debtor's exemption of benefits of an employment pen-
sion plan qualified under ERISA.  See In re  Daniel, 7 7 1
F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U . S .
1016 (1985); In re  Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th
Cir. 1985); In re  Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir .
1984);In re  Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); In
re  Gibben, 84 B.R. 494 (S.D. Ohio 1988); In re
Slezak, 63 B.R. 625 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986); In re
O'Brien, 50 B.R. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
One Texas Bankruptcy Court, however, held that a debtor's
interest in an employment plan is exempt under the "other federal
law" provision of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) , where the re-
tirement plan agreement contained anti-alienation language re-
quired by ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).  In re
Komet supra.  In so holding the court in Komet declined to fol-
low In re Goff which stated that ERISA does not create a federal
exemption for ERISA qualified plans.  An Arizona Bankruptcy
Court, however, has followed Goff and held the ERISA anti-
alienation provision not to create a federal exemption.  In re
Flindall, 105 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989).
In support of its holding, the Texas Bankruptcy Court argued
that because the ERISA anti-alienation provision has been held by
many courts to override state garnishment statutes, the anti-
alienation provision operates as a federal exemption.  The court
disagreed with Goff's assertion that the anti-alienation provision
served only as a qualification requirement for federal income tax
benefits.  See also Note, Exemption of ERISA Benefits
Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code,
83 Mich. L. Rev. 214 (Oct. 1984).
Cases, Regulations, and Statutes
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Adverse possession by prescription of
15 acres was granted where land possessors
had been conveyed the land but through a
scrivener's error, the deed described only
one-fourth of the intended acreage.  Posses-
sion was held adverse because the posses-
sors had asked the owners of record to sign
a corrective deed more than 20 years before
the current action and had openly and exclu-
sively used the land for farming and
recreation.  Daugherty v. Miller, 5 4 9
So.2d 65 (Ala. 1989).
AGRICULTURAL
LABOR
MIGRANT WORKERS.  Migrant farm
workers were not denied due process rights
by county health department's issuance of
permits for migrant farm worker's housing
which was substandard, because state hous-
ing permit laws did not create any due pro-
cess rights.  Issuance of permits for sub-
standard housing did not violate Fair Hous-
ing Act because such actions did not dis-
criminate against nonwhite migrant work-
ers.  Edwards v. Johnston County
Health Dept., 885 F.2d 1215 (4th
Cir. 1989).
ANIMAL PROTECTION
AND QUARANTINE
SWINE.  The Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) has issued pro-
posed regulations for allowance of interstate
transportation of swine vaccinated with
PRV/Marker  pseudorabies vaccine and
tested by the HardChek anti-PRV-gp
EKISA test.  54 Fed. Reg. 45739
(Oct. 31, 1989) amending 9
C.F.R. §§ 85.1, .6, .8-.10.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  Al-
though 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) is silent as to
whether interest on post-petition tax liabili-
ties receives administrative expense priority
along with the post-petition taxes, the
court held that the statute did not change
prior case law which held that interest on
post-petition taxes was entitled to
administrative expense priority.  In re Al-
lied Mechanical Services, Inc., 885
F.2d 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  Although under
Minnesota law, Minn. Stat. § 550.37,
Chapter 7 debtors had waived their right to
claim an exemption in farm equipment by
voluntarily granting a security interest in
the equipment, the debtors were allowed to
avoid the secured lien on the equipment as
impairing their exemption under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f): "Notwithstanding any waiver of
exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fix-
ing of a lien. . . ."  In re  Thompson,
884 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1989).
CASH COLLATERAL.  The debtor was
allowed to use cash collateral milk sales
proceeds which were subject to an assign-
ment to an oversecured creditor.  Adequate
protection was supplied by the value of
other collateral in excess of the creditor's
claim and by cash payments to the creditor.
Delbridge v. Prod. Credit Ass'n &
Federal Land Bank, 104 B.R. 8 2 4
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS.  Land sale
contract of farmland was an executory con-
tract requiring assumption or rejection by
Chapter 12 debtor before confirmation of
plan.  Contract vendee's right under Indiana
law to prevent forfeiture of the contract in
some instances did not alter nature of con-
tract as executory under federal bankruptcy
law.  In re  Coffman, 104 B.R. 9 5 8
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1989).
EXEMPTIONS.  Chapter 13 debtors were
not allowed to avoid a judgment lien
against their homestead where, under Ohio
law, the homestead was exempt as against
execution, attachment and sale but no exe-
cution, attachment or sale had been at-
tempted.  In re Dixon, 885 F.2d 3 2 7
(6th Cir. 1989), rev'g 85 B.R. 7 4 5
(N.D. Ohio 1988), aff'g 79 B . R .
702 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
Under Virginia law, debtors are required
to file a homestead exemption within five
days after the first creditor's meeting in a
bankruptcy case.  In a Chapter 13 case, the
court held that the Virginia filing require-
ment did not apply because the homestead
exemption was not used to remove property
from the bankruptcy estate.  Thus, the Vir-
ginia filing requirement applied only in
Chapter 7 cases.  However, the court also
